Aleksandar Vucic has been President of Serbia since 2017. An illiberal democrat and a populist, Vucic has mixed intimidation of opposition media at home with an intriguing foreign policy. The latter has translated into a fascinating balancing act between the EU, Russia and China. Re-elected in a landslide in April 2022, Vucic's presidency shows few signs of ending anytime soon.
My guest for this conversation is Vuk Vuksanovic, researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and is also an Associate at LSE Ideas (@v_vuksanovic on Twitter).
Aleksandar Vucic has been President of Serbia since 2017. An illiberal democrat and a populist, Vucic has mixed intimidation of opposition media at home with an intriguing foreign policy. The latter has translated into a fascinating balancing act between the EU, Russia and China. Re-elected in a landslide in April 2022, Vucic's presidency shows few signs of ending anytime soon.
My guest for this conversation is Vuk Vuksanovic, researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and is also an Associate at LSE Ideas (@v_vuksanovic on Twitter).
Hello and welcome back to the hated in the dead with Tom Leeman. In this episode, I returned to continental Europe for the first time in a little while. One of the more interesting trends in recent European politics has been the emergence of illiberal Democrats. These are leaders who are elected by large majorities, but who win with the total sycophancy of the media and threaten their opponents. Whilst it is a Liberal Democrats, Viktor Orban and Richard Tayyip Erdogan, who grabbed most of the headlines in Western Europe, the liberal credentials of Serbia's President Alexander Bucha, which deserve much greater attention. VirtualDJ has been President of Serbia since 2017, but his career in politics predates his ascendancy to Serbia's highest office by more than 20 years. elected as a parliamentarian in the early 1990s. He became Minister of Information under Slobodan Milosevic, as the greater Serbian Yugoslavia lurched from one wall to another, all in all, losing four wars in less than a decade. Now that Milosevic's cronies are back in power. The question remains as to whether people like rootage have modified their views from then. In reality, it doesn't seem like Richard believes in much at all, other than self preservation. In some ways, this makes him a much more interesting character to study than or ban or Erdogan, who have a much more identifiably right wing and religious appeal than Bucha edge. Serbia's President isn't showing any signs of leaving office anytime soon. Having been reelected last month, and his ability to play different world powers off against one another might give us an insight into the great power politics of the 21st century, as China's influence in Europe continues to grow. My guest for today's episode is BookBook Saanich. Voc is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for security policy, and is also an associate at LSE ideas or foreign policy think tank. He also writes prolifically about Serbian foreign and domestic policy issues. So I highly recommend you follow him on Twitter or LinkedIn. Ladies and gentlemen, it's time to introduce Alexander vintage. Hello, voc, it's good. See how you can hold on. Okay, given the time. Voc we're talking about Alexander vous church today. Richard has been President of Serbia since 2017. He's 52. He was born in 1970. What do you think is important about his early life for understanding the sort of politician that he has become? Well, I've would richer as the leader he is as contradictory as he is, as he is complex, so to speak. I mean, he has a very peculiar family background. I mean, his paternal ancestors were from the place called Burgoyne in central in the present day, central Bosnia. And of course, he frequently stresses this in his biography that during the World War Two, when, when a Nazi satellite state was established on the territory of present day Croatia and Bosnia called the Independent State of Croatia ruled by the Ustasha regime. His father's family in significant numbers were killed, systematically exterminated during this period. And this has shaped his early days nationalist outlook. And I mean, what is known frequently from his childhood was that he was a meticulous student of law at Belgrade, the faculty always bragging even up to this day about his high GPA during his studies. And at the same time, he was also quite a fanatical fan of famous Serbian Football Club, Red Star. So regarding his personality, he does speak that he is something of a fighter that he has a competitive spirit. And essentially, ever since he graduated from Belgrade University, he joined the Nationalist Party from that moment from that period, which still exists, although now it is insignificant in terms of number, but back then it was one of the most powerful political parties, the Serbian Radical Party. It was a national hardline Nationalist Party, which I mean had a very awkward relationship. On one hand, it was both frequently something of an opposition but at the same time, it was also more frequently an ally of the militia, which is regime in the 1990s. So this is the beginning of But Alexander voted his career back in those days. Something that's notable about butchers career is that he became a politician at a very young age, and he became a member of the National Assembly for the Serbian Radical Party when he was only 23 in 1993, this took place against an awful backdrop, which was the disintegration of the greater Yugoslavia. This is a very complicated period in a very complicated country, a country that no longer exists, but as briefly as you can, can you describe the situation in Yugoslavia in 1993, who was in charge? What form was this disintegration taking? And what did Serbs like? rootage think of the disintegration. Well, I mean, the country was in a complete disarray. What was left of Yugoslavia was called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and present the Montenegro and of course, while amela, which wasn't the president of what was ramped up Slavia, he was President of Serbia, everybody know where knew where the where the real power was. So I mean, it was during this period when the war in Croatia has been ongoing for two years and war in Bosnia was raging for one year. And of course, I mean, during this period, of course, we had, I mean, we had the Bosnian Serbs who enjoyed the during this period, a significant support from Belgrade, during what was otherwise a very violent period, while at the same time we had a complete disintegration of Serbian society during that period. I mean, the morale and the social and cultural norms were at an all time low, we had a massive, we had a massive brain drain, we as a result of UN sanctions, Serbia experienced at that time one of the highest hyperinflations recorded in economic history up until that point, which probably decimated the middle class, and we decimated civil society, in a sense, probably destroying along the way, many pockets of potential resistance to motion, which is regime during during this moment, in time. And at the same time, I think that we also had a very society which became highly as a result of it was highly impoverished. But as a result, the sanctions and international isolation of the country also paved the way for a whole set of other socio political pathologies, like organised crime and national security apparatus, which was also semi criminalised. So in a sense of some of these semi criminalised power structures probably continue to survive even after this point, although in a much more embellished form, given the transformation of the world in the country since then, as the 90s progressed, the situation in the former Yugoslavia really became worse and worse, it deteriorated further, there were about 100,000 casualties from the war in Bosnia. From the Serbian point of view, it wasn't good either. You had the deaths of many Bosnian Serbs at the hands of creations and Karina, the Serbs did not manage to halt the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, all became independent countries. In 1998, virtudes became Slava Dan Milosevic's minister for information. And what did this amount to what infamy information was he dealing with? Well, I mean, what we have to stress was that these were probably two. The two most notorious episodes related to Alexander voltage from the 1990s was that he was young, but at the same time, everybody knew that he was probably much more educated and much more intelligent. Compared to most other members of the Serbian Radical Party. He was extremely competitive, and extremely vicious, vicious, vicious opponent, particularly when it came to political debates and political duels. And at the same time to have his and he was extremely toxic in his rhetoric at various points during this period. And probably the two most striking elements of his career During this moment in time was number one was one of his statements in 1995, when he was the Serbian NP, and this was probably this was around the period when when Astra needs the legendary massacre, which was later designated by genocide by several international courts to place when one of his statements was a message to the international community. You feel retaliate and kill one serves we will kill for every murder serves 100 Muslims, and at the same time there was a second, the second striking element of him during this period was The fact that he became a minister of information during the 2008, so that he was in charge of the media system. And, of course, very restrictive legislation, the Federal have very restrictive legislation was imposed on their own newspapers and TV as TV stations. And I mean, during this time, there was a significant attempt by the regime to suppress the media. And during the NATO bombing, a very famous episode that happened when an anti regime journalist Slavko Truvia, was assassinated, in what in later Later trials that turned out to be by state security operatives. And of course, given that before the death of Mr. Chu Rovia. Key was persecuted by Mr. Bucha, Mr. Which is also someone who, whose name is frequently affiliated with, with this deaf, so these are probably the two most striking episodes of Mr. wattage from the 1990s. So VirtualDJ was a propaganda minister that's that's the Minister of Information is a euphemism for propaganda really, isn't it? Well, that would that certainly, particularly during those periods, but I think it is pretty salient for the way he behaves today. I mean, all of many of the people who knew him spoke openly about his political profile and his personality to the Serbian media. And many of them actually, underline that he is essentially obsessed with the with the art of Political Marketing, and with political communications, and that he's diligently studies all possible literature in the Reagan, Serbian or in English, about the political marketing and that he has mastered. And in a sense, yes, he also he's the meat, the media machinery, which is one of the pillars of the system, which is over which he presides, today is also one of the very, very striking elements of his power. Yes, if we look at the sort of post Milosevic period, massive, which was ousted from power after the war in Kosovo in 2000, and he eventually died in prison in The Hague whilst he was on trial for war crimes. What happened to Serbian politics in the years after that happened and what happened to the supporters of Milosevic like Alexander butchered? Well, what you have to realise is that there was a lot of locomotion during the period in the first 12 years after a militia, which was ousted, and that escaped many Western viewers because I mean, from that moment in time, okay, there was no war in the Balkans, so nothing to cover the front pages of the Serbian media, all sorts of other things happen like war in Iraq, so attention of the world was somewhere else whenever they would open up at foreign policy columns in in Western newspapers for that matter. However, Serbia have entered into a very specific period during this time, and I think that this is one of the things which most Western observers are not aware of, because most of the time, the liberal conventional wisdom in the West is all the bad guys von democracies established. So it's a fairy tale ending from that moment in time. However, I think that the system which emerged the sadly for most of most of the Serbs, now have a very cynical reaction to the to the meaning of the word democracy ever since then, because they believe that what was replaced was a system in which the parties which compose the coalition, which overthrew militia, which were constantly bickering about the share about the spoils, and about who will be the minister in the coalition government. And at the same time, we also had a whole set of other very, very upsetting trends like privatisation which also put which also resulted in a loss of significant wealth from the standpoint of Serbian citizens. So, the economic transition also didn't work out quite quite as well for many in the Serbian society as they had as they had hoped. Meanwhile, you also had the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister's Orangina which in 2003, so, from that moment in time, you call for them the word democracy in a sense, became, became a became just a synonym for a system of small time in tricks between between various opportunistic political parties. And, in a sense, Alexander Bucha was able to to basically plug in into this dissatisfaction with with the years with the failures of posting the Washington Post economic transition. Of course, during this moment in time, we also had a major shift in the balance of power. Because while our militia which is regime the Socialist Party of Serbia continues to exist First and it's still a formidable player, it is no longer a major player. Most of the voters have this, shall we say nationalist or socially conservative, socially conservative elements of the Serbian society started voting for the Serbian Radical Party, which during this period was no longer run by its traditional leader voice or Shaco, was in The Hague during this moment in time, but it was run by his two lieutenants, the first one was Thomas of Nikolaj, who even became Serbian president in between 2012 and 2016. And the second one is Alexander Woodridge. And during this moment in time, they really developed a very, very powerful political party. However, it was their anti Western and hardline stance, which always prevented them from actually winning the power despite a very powerful numerical numerical size. So, this is the change of tactics which are followed, then allow them actually to, to win power and to return but I presume that we will talk about this in more details now. Yes, so that Thomas Love Nicola Nicola, to you mentioned a second ago, I think, became Serbian president in 2012. And he, in a sense, I suppose, relaunched the political career of Alexander Bucha in power when he nominated him to be Prime Minister in 2014. I think an important question to ask at this stage is you've had, as you mentioned, a sort of 12 year period where the Milosevic group, were mostly in opposition. And then after 2012, they've come back in the important question, I suppose is have these people that the Nicollet churches, and the virtual churches, have they actually changed and moderated their views from the loss of Algeria? Or is this just in effect, a kind of rebrand, you know, a bit like the Taliban in their timeout and power? They've just learned how to do PR, essentially? Well, it's a bit I believe it's a bit complicated, more complicated in debt. I think it is a mixture of these political tactics. I mean, on. On one hand, I think that what both Tommy SonicWALL each and Alexander Bucha, realised during this moment in time, that in 2008, they were uncapable of winning power, despite the fact that it was the year when Kosovo's independence occurred. So you would have expected that Serbian nationalist party would would seize this opportunity. But at the same time, I also think that they saw that for many Serbs, while they may be irritated with Kosovo's independence for many of them, issues like economy and welfare were equally important when it came to winning power. So they realise that if they don't become acceptable partners to the Western world, they will they will never be able to win power. And it was during this moment moment in time when Alex Thomas are both Thomas Nikolaj and Alexander bhootish broke away for a Serbian Radical Party and voice of Shashi who was in cake. And they took with them a significant portion of Serbian Radical parties votes and, and their infrastructure and their membership. And it was during this moment in time when they established contacts with Western embassies with Western governments and said that they will embrace European Union as part of their foreign policy programme. So this is a way how they actually not only what enabled them to come in come in power, but they were able to outmanoeuvre their all the opponents like the central left pro EU Democratic Party, because up until that moment in time, the Democratic Party was would always be capable of scaring the voters by saying you should vote for us or otherwise, these nationalist guys will come to power. While at the same time these guys brilliantly outmanoeuvre them will teach and equally among other things, by promising to the Western capitals that they will be able to finally to resolve the causal dispute. And in a sense many call this moment Nixon in China moment, the idea that former nationalist will be able to make these deals with former with former enemies. And of course, they had a great trump card to play the fact that they were the ones who control the the most conservative and most nationalist part of the Serbian electorate. So they believe that they have the capacity to master any potential fallout on any compromises with costal. So this deal with the West alongside, alongside the displeasure of the Serbian of the Serbian electorate with global financial crisis and with cronyism associated with the up until then ruling Democratic Party allowed them to win power in 2012 fruitage was elected the president Serbia in five years later after Nikolaj in 2017. I've often seen him characterise as an authoritarian as an illiberal Democrat a populist. The term democratic backsliding, this idea of sort of moving or regressing from democratic norms is a term that's thrown around a lot to describe different leaders probably in Europe, it's most commonly used about Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban. But some people have tried to characterise Boris Johnson's attempt to shut down Parliament during Brexit as backsliding for instance, what's the nature of democratic backsliding in Serbia, under voltage? And if you were to compare him to one of those people a very extreme case of backsliding under Putin, a less severe case under all ban and a less severe case again, under Johnson? Which one would it be? I think that of those three, which you cited, probably he shares most resemblance with Orban rather than with Putin or Johnson, I think that he, he's a very peculiar animal, the Alexandra nutrition that we don't talk about today. I think that probably Alexander Bucha. He is one of those cases where I think that think tankers should talk to psychologists much more than they talk with political scientists, for that matter, because personalities are quite a because personalities and profiles are quite complex. I do think that we are speaking about a leader who is really upset, obsessed about making himself this candle leader, the guy who can shake, shake the ground, who can do the impossible, who can, who can, who can overcome obstacles that his predecessors could not. And as a result, he is also highly competitive. And I also think that this is probably, in part explains his media, media censorship, in a sense, being a person who, who receives criticism very, very badly. I mean, I've been a if I believe that this is part of his, both his personality and political tactic, that every conversation with a journalist is always a potential a potential battle for him. So this is this is the way he operates. But in a sense, I think that he's he's the system that he established. Just like the system that Viktor Orban established in Hungary, still pretty much resembles what is usually called as some call it hybrid regime, while some others call it an illiberal democracy, a system of governance where the leader does have a democratic legitimacy in terms in in a sense that he does have a majority among the voters. But the way he governs he doesn't govern in accordance with the liberal principles in terms of he uses the media public administration, the national security apparatus to get ahead in front of any any competitors. But if we are talking about this comparison between Gucci and Viktor Orban, and I hope that you will allow me to be a bit more wide on that point. I think that there is a still major differences between the two, I think that Viktor Orban despite, of course, everybody's hypocrite in politics, both liberals and liberals, so to speak, but I mean, what is I think, striking about Viktor Orban is he does have an ambition of being something of an international ideological brand when it comes to this concept of illiberal democracy. Or Ben, I'll openly acknowledge that he wants Hungary to be illiberal democracy would reach on the other hand, number one, he wants to pretend that he's this liberal candle leader to the Western world. I mean, while Orban openly speaks about the liberal democracy will teach it goes nuts when Freedom House designates his country as a hybrid regime, or when Twitter designates his media outlets as government affiliated. And at the same time, I also think that he doesn't have that much of an ideology because depending on what suits him at this moment in time, he can do anything in foreign policy one day he can be in the EU in Brussels and European Commission. The next day he can be in the Kremlin or resort talking with SI Jinping for that matter, or he can he can of course he can one day he can talk about a he can talk about he can stoke national grievances. Well, Allah second day, he appoints an LGBT woman to be his Prime Minister. So he doesn't care that much about the concepts which for which are part of Viktor Orban his brand? Yes, I think they will ban there's definitely more of a kind of identifiably conservative populism in terms of sort of anti multicultural, you know, quite an extreme conception of sort of Fair Christian democracy. What does the church say about the wider Balkan region region for people listening who don't know very much about the area, it's worth pointing out the relations between different former Yugoslav republics aren't entirely harmonious today. What did he say for instance, about the status of the Serbs that still reside in Bosnia, this became a big issue last November, when Milorad Dodik the the leader of the Serb SCO Republic other the Serbian part of Bosnia that still exists today sort of flirted with the idea of taking himself out of Bosnian institutions. What did he say about this issue? Well, I mean, this is these are all complicated issues. I mean, if we are going to first do a macro picture of how Bucha operates in the wider region of the Balkans? I think there are no I think that we no longer have open conflicts, but we do have wounds which haven't quite healed. The dominant narrative among post Yugoslav republics is, of course, that the first idea which pops to their mind when they hear the word Alexander Bucha, which is still Alexander will teach her from the 1990s. While on the other hand, Alexander will teach is still stoking this, this I mean, idea, sometimes, I mean, it might be fat, or sometimes it is misuse, sometimes it has some foundation in truth. That is, of course, that he's unhappy with the status that some of the Serbian communities have. And of course, the fact that he believes that every time when he raises this issue, his criticism has been deflected by invoking the case of Serbia from the 1990s. So this is so I think that part of his the way he has been able to stay in power and get acquiescence from the west is the concept which became quite popular among among the Balkan watchers in recent years, even it may have even been used, this concept has perhaps been overused. And it became something of a cliche, but it's still very much true. The term stability, stability tocris Because as the EU is unable to enlarge to the Balkans, they still need the Balkan to be relatively stable. So you have strong man leaders who say tell to them, well, we will keep it stable, but you have to still continue subsidising us with EU funds and you still have to turn a blind eye to what we do at to what we do at home. So in a sense, in order to preserve this image of stability, you're correct. So he's a very, so he's perfectly capable of first stoking some, some form of tensions with his neighbour only to jump in at the last moment and skin being the only one who can bring peace. And he has achieved this very successfully, although I think that his relationship with with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Milorad Dodik, has been more complex than most waters belief. Because the two might appear as allies where Dodik appears to be the one who, who is about to start a firewall, while water which is being the firemen who can save the date. And this partnership, it is also true that dhadak is something of a loose cannon compared to what he as Dodik is more of a local player, so he's much more unpredictable than Alexander voltage. So we always have this uneasy partnership where we never know when the two are actually engaged in a premeditated that good cop, bad cop routine. And when does actually, Dottie cudos does something on a loose like a loose cannon. And when he's even causing troubles for Bucha himself, so the two are engaged in an opportunistic partnership. But this is of course, this point. This is of course, this point, which is very complex about the relationship between Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs, because frequently we even saw this during the Bosnian war. I mean, because we never know for the Belgrade leadership never knows when their bread rings embossed they might do something unpredictable which might drag sack them into unnecessary conflict. While at the same time the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs is also sometimes sometimes weary that Belgrade serves will sell them out in some great bargain with the West we did SOS saw something similar during the Dayton Peace Accords, when Milosevic sidelined the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Dayton peace accord. So these, so yes, there are all these sorts of there are all of these sorts of disruptive dynamics and disruptive relationships, but they also think that we have a lot of opportunistic mistrust below the surface, so no one trusts anyone in the Balkans these days. As you said, to some extent, the kind of international media isn't really very focused on Yugoslavia and hasn't really been focused on Yugoslavia since the late 1990s. Obviously, there's only so much kind of bandwidth in the international media, I think it often shows quite a poor ability to kind of focus on two things at once. But do you think that the West should be more concerned about recent goings on in the former Yugoslavia? How concerned are you about the prospect of war in your neck of the woods again? War is not the thing, which concerns me because I think that there is still that most of the countries are in NATO, or some of them are in the EU, like Croatia and Slovenia. And of course, we still have NATO security as Western security presents, like the EU peacekeeping force you for in Bosnia or the Kosovo Kosovo force, which is NATO peacekeeping commission. So on that point, I am not, I don't believe that there will be a war particularly since every strong man in the Balkans know that this would attract Western ire and potentially Western military intervention. And at the same time, we also have the fact that there is, of course, issue that the region is despite the fact that some equal local economies might experience growth, it is still socio economically stagnating region called if one compares it to the rest of the rest of Europe, which is also demographically haemorrhaging and ageing. So that means that there might not be that much energy, enthusiasm, or even resources to commence conflicts on any scale, like the ones we have seen in the 1990s. However, I do think that West should be worried about the fact that it does has an empty hole, an empty hole in a region, which is situated in triangle between Europe, Russia, Turkey, and wider Middle East, which is in his back in his backyard, and which, of course, is while it doesn't produce war, it does produce a whole set of other other instabilities like the issue of poor governance, dysfunctional, dysfunctional politics. But and which can all which can always be, if not the theatre of war, but always a potential theatre of political dysfunction, and political and political crises. So the West should definitely keep an eye on the Balkans much more than it is, than it is keeping it today. But it's not because of the potential war, the type of problems are completely different. Getting back to VirtualDJ, if we move the lens slightly further away than just the Balkan Serbia, you've sort of mentioned this in passing Serbia has a very interesting foreign policy more generally, it's a candidate country for EU membership. It also has friendly relations with Russia, and it has pretty good relations with China as well. I remember reading early on in the pandemic, the voltage had said that the EU had turned his back on Serbia, and there was now China that Serbia was going to count on as an ally, it seems from a distance that virtue is essentially trying very hard not to kind of hedge his bets. He doesn't want to get too close to one of these units. Is that basically his strategy? Is he just a essentially an opportunist in this in this way? I think it's over an entire foreign policy has been opportunist for quite some time. I think that in a sense after if we can't, I mean, of course, some of you our listeners who are cold war nerds might know the story about nonaligned Yugoslavia. But I mean, of course, during the 1990s, as one of my former professors said, the whole point of Serbian foreign policy in the 1980s was this, there was no foreign policy, the country was isolated, and it was so much involved in its own domestic troubles. And of course, the conflict will trade in the region, that there was no interest in the in the world out there. The country had no capacity to implement foreign policy. And in between 2002 1008 We had something of an attempt by the post Molosser, which is government to be fully integrated in the West. I mean, back in those days, you could even hear the word Euro Atlantic integration. It's not European integrations, but you're Atlantic integrations, which also involve potentially NATO membership. Today, any politician would commit political suicide if he used the word Euro Atlantic back in the first eight years of postman, Russia, which is period that was not an attempt. But what has really altered a Serbian foreign policy has been the year 2008 Because I think that the year 2008 was a seminal year for Serbian foreign policy because of the two events. The first one was the global financial crisis, which Of course obstructed the EU's ability to finish enlargement in the Balkans and we are not seeing that it has progressed after this very day. Of course, there were other crises as well, which followed which impaired Europe, but this one was the start of this process. And the second one was Kosovo independence. So in a sense, these two processes shape a Serbian foreign policy up to this date. Because in a sense, you have a country which is stranded on Europeans periphery, with the with the unresolved territorial dispute. So from that moment on, I think that even when we had a nominally pro, you left central government empowering Ballweg, you, you had this new idea in Serbian foreign policy, okay, we should still strive towards Europe. But given the fact that Europe is not always sure of itself. And given that we have Kosovo dispute for which we still don't have an adequate solution, we should hedge our bets, we should diversify our partnership, talk to new guys. Of course, Russia was the first which sees it. And as time progressed, you will also have China which in the past two years, I will say or probably I think even has replaced the Russia SRBs primary partner in the East. And of course, other minor players have also joined again, in the Balkans. We have turkey, we have Israel, United Arab Emirates. But I think that in a sense, wu chi chi is in as he has just perfected and accelerate accelerated the game and process which was already in place, even before he came to power. And how do you think that's gone? They're sort of courting different people at the same time, do you think it's actually worked very well. I think it had the I think it produced tactical, I think it is a tactical policy, but with no strategic and gain. I think that this policy appears successful for the simple reason that there is no strategy because most the way society is run in the Balkans and the way the state affairs are being run in the Balkans. Most of the time, you're, you're essentially more concerned about short, eventually midterm solutions, you're basically worried of worried about surviving this day, and not what what international process might happen in the next five, five to 10 years. But I think that the ongoing war in Ukraine will probably be the toughest challenge so far for Serbian leadership, at least not perhaps on all of its international partnerships. But certainly when it comes to its partnership with Moscow. What has Richard actually said about Ukraine about the invasion? Well, I think that this is a case where Serbian diplomacy, at least in the beginning, was slightly more skillful compared to the initial Ukraine crisis of 2014. In 2014, when the annexation of Crimea took place, and this was a very peculiar year for Serbian foreign policy. Because during this that year, Serbia was about to start its accession talks with the EU, and it was still hoping for, for the completion of now defunct Russian pipeline project South Stream and it also received some cash credit lines from Russia during this period. And then comes the Ukraine crisis. And of course, the Serbian diplomacy simply reacts by by flying under the radar and without declaring itself hoping that it will go unnoticed. And of course, it attracted a lot of diplomatic heat as a result of this posture. However, now, I think that the circuit came in front. I mean, it, it said that it that particularly since it has possible disputes that it unequivocally supports territorial integrity of every state, including Ukraine, and you can even vote it on several UN resolutions against Russia to that point. But but the key problem is that he's not from the standpoint of the West, is that he's not joining us sanctions against Russia. And so in so now he's essentially stuck. On one hand, there is a West and he needs a Western acquiescence, both in order to stay in power, but also for the fact that, you is, is essentially the is essentially the piggy bank from which the economy lives on. While on the other hand, he has Russia where it is not just an issue of Kosovo and gas dependency that Serbia has visibly Moscow, but I think it is also this is and this is the part where which fell into his own trap. Is the enormous ly high popularity of Russia in Serbian public opinion. Because when people ask why is Russia so popular? They momentarily think it is Because of the Slavic or orthodox ties between the two countries, however, the knowledge that the average Serbian citizens has on Russian culture except for the most educated ones who read the Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy I mean, about their culture or about their current politics is extremely limited. Popularity of Russia is most frequently an emotional frustration with the customers independents are a result of the memories of the 1990s. So not some deep seated philosophical roots of failure. But that popularity was there. However, in the past eight years in order both to profit from Serbian Russo philia and in order to blackmail the West, who teaches media and tabloid machine a has turned Putin into a rock star. So now he cannot. So now he cannot reverse a policy course without significantly angering significant portions of the electorate and the public opinion. So now he's so now he is faced with probably the most one of the most daring challenges of his political career at this moment in time. If you imagine, I know it's still is a fairly long way off, in all likelihood, but if Serbia did become a fully fledged member state of the European Union, it seems consistent with the church's fairly opportunistic foreign policy that as soon as he was inside, the EU would suddenly become a scapegoat in the same way that it has for all ban and for Law and Justice in Poland. What do you think the government's relationship with the EU would be if Serbia was actually to use the Lyndon Johnson phrase inside the tent pissing out rather than outside the tent pissing in? Well, i To be frank, it is a very hard question. I mean, because I will because for the simple reason, when people asked me about, like, oh, well we owe is for our Serbia's relations with Russia or China. endangering Serbia's EU accession path, I would most frequently say, I would most frequently say to them, China, China and Russia are successful in the Balkans because the EU it is not because you have neglected both Serbia and the region for a very long time. Not in terms of money, but in terms of policy strategy. And as a result, others have sees the this vacuum. And so I can't say that until Gucci, Gucci sincerely believes that he will join the EU I can't see him making any major any major changes. So it is so it is such and it is even more difficult to imagine EU enlarging given the war in Ukraine, which will also trigger a significant significant recession, which which also impact negatively European economies, I can't imagine that enlargement will be happening. So I think that what we are seeing now is probably not so much an issue whether the EU will enlarge to the Balkans, but it's probably an issue of whether you will at least use the opportunity to tie the Balkans more firmly to itself. So I think that this is such a far fetched scenario that it is even in that it is even immaterial and impossible to even contemplate about Serbian behaviour. Even though some are concerned about Serbia being a potential Trojan horse for Russia or China like Hungary, or some other countries might be. If you look at the eastward expansion of the EU so far, since 2004, roughly, there's quite a famous labour politician in the UK called Dennis Skinner, very left wing, anti EU labour politician. He's quite old now he's no longer in Parliament. And I was watching an interview with him a few years ago and the interviewer asked him why he was against the eastward expansion of the EU. And he said, because all the Eastern European countries are right wing. And to be fair, he might be right. If you think about Oban and Lauren justice in Poland, as somebody who comes from southeastern Europe, VOOk, how successful do you think the Eastern expansion of the EU has been? Because it has definitely exposed sort of cultural differences between a broadly liberal secular, Western Europe and a broadly conservative Christian, Eastern Europe. Yeah, I think that this has been one of the crisis impacting, of course, the the EU and of course, I mean, we had the famous statement by George Bush's secretary of defence In the wake of the Iraq War, Donald Rumsfeld about the old and new Europe, although he was probably talking about it more from that, from the standpoint of America's of America's geopolitical interests, but I think that he says exposed that there is something of a divide something of the divide between the West and Eastern Europe, which has been written quite competently, by Yvonne clustering. He's in his work. And but I think that we will be seeing a new type of East West divide in the EU, which I think has been triggered by which has been triggered by provide Ukraine war. I think that on one hand, we will have a division between the countries who are angry about potentially or some are more angry, some are not, but who are still concerned about the war in Ukraine, believing that it can go worse, and that it can impact the both their security and their economy even more and who would like to see the conflict resolved? I think that countries which fall under this category are probably Germany, Austria, France, and paradoxically, I mean, politics makes strange bedfellows, Viktor Orban in Hungary. So we will have this type of blokes who are on the other hand, we will have Eastern European EU member states whose historical grievances and the security anxieties regarding Russia have been augmented as a result of this ongoing war and who want to see Russia punished for its invasion of Ukraine. So I think that this will be another great faultline in the, in the in the European project. But if we are talking from the standpoint of Serbia, I think that we will be seen probably from the standpoint of Alexander who teach a policy of probably if he likes in foreign policy terms to balance and play Eastern and Western powers against each other. In order to survive, he will probably also be forced now more and more to balance and play various sub blocks within the EU, one against another. So things are just becoming more fluid and more chaotic and more complex. I think what's come across in this conversation is that Alexander Bucha edge is very sly, very calculating and very smart as a politician much smarter, I think than what I've read about Slobodan Milosevic, who by all accounts was not very smart at all. It it. If we go to the issue of democratic backsliding again, it's often the case that authoritarians never leave office or don't want to leave office even if they end up losing elections. Viktor Orban is still in power. Vladimir Putin is still in power. How long do you think vous church plans to rule Serbia for? I think as long as possible for that matter? I think that one of the great role models that he has had, is the President of Montenegro, amela Gioconda, which who has ruled in Montenegro ever since the communist days for the past for more than 30 years, and his tenure can only be compared to the Central Asian strongmen for that, for that matter. So I think that this is the type of model that he tries to emulate in Serbia in the semi private state. However, he is still someone who has to get a majority in the government. So in a sense, I think that he will be forced to he will be a forced at one at one point, it all depends on when the viable counter candidate appears, because let's face it, I mean, or the one has hit was decimating opposition in one election after another until he lost the stumble and great urban centres in Turkey. And of course, now everybody's asking whether that will happen during the next presidential elections in Turkey. So it's an uphill battle for the opposition, but there is no other way that in, in this dysfunctional hybrid regimes that you can win power. I just have one more question. It's a slight, slightly less serious note and more humorous and I when I was researching for this interview, yesterday, I found a video of somebody collecting a merit of sort of merit of Serbia award in February, somebody who's from Alexander Bucha, somebody who's been in the news a lot the last couple of weeks it was it was Johnny Depp. Have you picked up on this story at all? Can you can you offer any offer any interesting notes as to why VirtualDJ and Johnny Depp seem to have seemed to have struck up such a good relationship? I think it has to do partly with I seen him being given given a metal by Alexander which I think It has to do with two things. I think that some many SERPs in a sense the general public opinion against this type of, I guess, this type of tendency to be liked by the outside world, because SERPs have been greatly shaped by the memories of the 1990s when everybody was when, even though serfs who were who were not pro militia, which were sort of identified with, with, with butchers from Bosnia, so to speak, so, in a sense, they many serves like the fact when when someone says a good word about them, so sometimes it receives even something of a surreal level the way it has been advertised in the media, but as a result of this very, very awkward, very awkward and unpleasant historical memories. So the fact that Johnny Depp was filming couple of movies in Serbian the occasion and Serbia has become something of a popular site for Hollywood movies because of the because of the cheap prices. And when so when some of these guys come to here to record movies ETL it is being interpreted as contributing to the Serbian image and add to that just the tendency of Alexander rootage to promote himself as being filmed next to the Hollywood star you have this type of imagery well I'll be waiting for the church to present Amber Heard with a merit award now as well. Well, I can't say I can't speak for him but that's been great thank you very much and where can people find your work if they want you're you're quite prolific writer on on Serbian foreign policy issues where can people find your your work? Well, I mean, they can find it at my at my Twitter handle, so it's quite easily accessible and I post all my stuff here. So I mean, I don't have a website but with all of my work collection, but I but perhaps I will develop it as a result of our conversation. Yes, I hope so. Thank you very much. Cheers. Thank Thank you for listening to the hated in the dead. 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